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Abstract
Given Spanish banks’ heavy investment in the housing and construction markets in the leadup to the global financial crisis (GFC), the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, impelled the government to
implement stabilization measures to calm, recapitalize, and restructure its domestic banking
sector. The Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme) was
one of the first interventions to be enacted, announced by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and
Finance on October 13, 2008, by Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 on “Urgent Economic and
Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan of the Countries in the Euro
Zone.” The scheme entered into force upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008
on November 21, 2008. The program, funded from Spain’s annual budget, initially committed
up to €100 billion for the state guarantee of new and senior unsecured debt instruments
issued by credit institutions, consolidated groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit
institutions registered in Spain. Later it was expanded to €164 billion. Per the terms of the
original Ministerial Order, debt with maturities ranging from three months to three years—
or between three years and five years under special circumstances—was covered under the
Guarantee Scheme. Between November 21, 2008, and December 31, 2011, the Spanish
government guaranteed €69.7 billion in debt issuances. No defaults occurred.
Keywords: Spain, government guarantee, credit institutions, short-term debt, mediumterm debt, guarantee scheme

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee
programs.
1
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Spanish Guarantee Scheme for
Credit Institutions
At a Glance
Spain’s economy was severely impacted by
the collapse of the subprime mortgage
market and the subsequent bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. One of the first steps the
government took to calm markets and
restore confidence in lending institutions
was to introduce the Guarantee Scheme for
Credit Institutions.
Announced on October 13, 2008, the
Guarantee Scheme committed up to
€100 billion in funding for guaranteeing
debt issued by participating credit
institutions. Applicants to the program had
to meet certain capitalization requirements,
possess a share equal to at least 1/1000 of
the domestic credit market, and have
already issued debt similar to that covered
by the Guarantee Scheme.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To restore confidence in the financing
mechanism of credit institutions and to support
increased lending to businesses and households
Announcement Date

October 13, 2008

Operational Date

November 21, 2008

Date of First Guaranteed
Loan Issuance
Issuance Window
Expiration Date

February 3, 2009

Outcomes

Originally June 30,
2009; Extended to
December 31, 2011
€100 billion (initial);
Increased to
€164 billion in 2009
€69.7 billion;
total of 229 issuances by
44 credit institutions
No defaults

Notable Features

High fees relative to

Program Size
Usage

value of guarantee given
Initially, new and senior unsecured debt
low sovereign credit
instruments, including promissory notes,
rating
bonds, and other obligations admitted to
trade on the official secondary markets in Spain with maturities ranging from three months
to three years were eligible for coverage under the program. Debt with maturities of up to
five years could also be guaranteed if granted special permission from the Bank of Spain.

Although originally set to expire on June 30, 2009, the issuance window of the Guarantee
Scheme was extended five times to conclude on December 31, 2011. Between December 29,
2008, and December 31, 2011, the Spanish government guaranteed a total of
€69.7 billion in debt issued mainly by regional Spanish credit institutions.
Summary Evaluation
While there has not been much explicit evaluation of the Guarantee Scheme, the intervention
was seen as having been an important and early step in the stabilization of the credit markets
that later allowed for the vital restructuring and recapitalization of major Spanish financial
institutions.
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Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions: Spain Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$1.5 trillion in 2007
$1.6 trillion in 2008

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$32,550 per capita in 2007
$35,366 per capita in 2008

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

As of Q4, 2007:

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system

$2.4 trillion in total assets in 2007
$2.9 trillion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP

166.1% in 2007
179.5% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

Data not available for 2007/2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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79.3% of total banking assets in 2007
77.8% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database

Foreign involvement
in banking system

2.0% of total banking assets in 2007
2.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database

Government
ownership of banking
system
Existence of deposit
insurance

0.0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
100% insurance on deposits up to $14,285
Source: Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and
Related Financial Safety Net Aspects, OECD
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Overview

Background
Having been heavily reliant on the housing and construction markets in the lead-up to the
height of the global financial crisis (GFC), Spain’s economy began to decline rapidly in the
third quarter of 2008 and GDP continued to fall for five consecutive quarters during the
remainder of 2008 and throughout 2009 (Ortega and Peñalosa 2012). This contractionary
cycle reflected that of other EU member states, but it was especially impactful given the
nation’s substantial exposure to the subprime loan crisis. Furthermore, a sharp increase in
the external deficit, the widespread overvaluation of exports, soaring unemployment, and
the inability of the Economic Monetary Union of the EU to adequately address Spain’s
deteriorating economic condition collectively contributed to the severity of the recession
that would outlast that of most peers (Ortega and Peñalosa 2012).
In response to this severe market disruption, the Spanish government sought to enact
stabilization measures that would safeguard its domestic economy and relieve the negative
impacts of the international credit crunch. One of the first interventions to be put into effect
was the Spanish Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions (the Guarantee Scheme),
announced by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance on October 13, 2008, and
implemented upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 for the granting of State
guarantees on December 29, 2008. Its dual purpose was to “[reestablish] confidence in the
financing mechanism of credit institutions and to increase lending to businesses and
households” (European Commission 2008b).
Program Description
Under the initial terms of the Guarantee Scheme, Spain committed up to €100 billion for the
guarantee of new and senior unsecured debt issuances by credit institutions, consolidated
groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit institutions registered in Spain. This funding
was drawn down from the national government’s annual budgets for 2008 and 2009 and
could be increased to €200 billion if the Bank of Spain deemed it necessary given current
market conditions. In 2009, the overall budget for the scheme was adjusted to €164 billion
for 2008 and 2009 pursuant to Royal Decree Law 9/2009.
To participate in the program, credit institutions needed explicit approval from the
Directorate General of the Treasury and Financial Policy. Subsidiaries of foreign credit
institutions were eligible for participation but were subject to the same regulations as those
registered in Spain. Branches of foreign credit institutions were not covered under the
Guarantee Scheme.

896

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

All applicants, regardless of type or association, needed to be “sufficiently capitalized in line
with the national legislation” to qualify for admission.3 Eligibility was further restricted to
applicants that possessed at least 1/1000 of the domestic credit market and had issued, since
October 13, 2003 (five years previous to the entry into force of Royal Decree-Law 7/2008),
instruments “similar to the ones covered by the present Guarantee Scheme” (European
Commission 2008b). For consolidated groups of credit institutions and pools of credit
institutions, only one subsidiary had to meet the criteria.
Debt eligible under the Guarantee Scheme included new and senior unsecured debt
instruments, including promissory notes, bonds, and other obligations admitted to trade on
the official secondary markets in Spain, with maturities of between three months and three
years. Under exceptional circumstances, the Bank of Spain reserved the right to guarantee
debts with maturities of between three and five years. Securitization notes and subordinated
debts were not eligible. Furthermore, although the original Royal Decree-Law 7/2008
initially provided for the possibility of covering such other financial instruments as
interbank deposits, Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008—which legally enforced the Royal
Decree-Law and upon which the European Commission based its authorization—excluded
interbank deposits, options, derivatives, and other instruments “for which the amount of risk
might be difficult to assess by the guarantor” (European Commission 2008b).
Although there were no currency restrictions or limits on the issuance of non-guaranteed
debt associated with the Guarantee Scheme, the original terms required that the notional
value of each debt issuance covered be at least €10 million. Additionally, the Ministry of
Economy and Finance imposed individual caps on participation based on the proportion of
the participant’s domestic market share, but reserved the right to further limit the cap if
deemed necessary to “reduce the risk involved with granting the guarantee” (European
Commission 2008b).
Spain assessed individual participation fees according to the European Central Bank’s
“Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20, 2008
(European Central Bank 2008). These fees would thus vary based on the soundness of the
issuing institution—determined by five-year credit default swap (CDS) spreads between
January 2007 and August 2008—and the maturity of the debt to be guaranteed. Credit
institutions were required to pay the appropriate fees to the Spanish government upon each
issuance of guaranteed debt.
As part of the terms of the Guarantee Scheme, the government agreed to waive the
beneficium excussionis historically associated with Spanish guarantee programs.4 As such, in
the case of a participating institution’s default on a covered debt issuance, the Bank of Spain
was required to assume responsibility for the principal and interest through maturity. The

According to Law 36/2007, dated November 16 , 2007, modifying Law 13/1985, dated May 25, 1985, and
Royal Decree 216/2008, dated February 15, 2008.
4 Embodied in Article 1.830 of the Spanish Civil Code, the beneficium excussionis “refers to the right or benefit
of the guarantor not to be compelled to pay as long as the principal has enough property” (European
Commission 2008b).
3
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associated interest rate could be either fixed or variable and had to “be placed within the
market yield of emissions and issuers with similar characteristics” (European Commission
2008b). The principal amount had to be repaid to the Bank of Spain in a single payment.
Outcomes
Although the Guarantee Scheme was introduced as a temporary stabilization measure with
an expiration date of June 30, 2009, the program’s issuance window was extended five times,
each for a period of six months, until December 31, 2011 (see Appendix A).
While the government guaranteed debt issued throughout the three-year duration of the
program, all issuances made were assigned to either the 2008 or 2009 annual budget
according to Spain’s General Budget Law. Under the 2008 annual budget, 44 credit
institutions issued €47.3 billion in guaranteed debt. Under the 2009 annual budget, 32 of the
same 44 Spanish credit institutions issued €22.4 billion in guaranteed debt. A majority of
these issuances were made by regional savings banks, while none of the Spanish Big Four—
Bankia, BBVA, Caixabank, and Santander—took advantage of the Guarantee Scheme. All
debts outstanding under the program were fully amortized by May 10, 2016.
The Guarantee Scheme was reintroduced, with slightly different terms, in February 2012, as
part of a series of government stabilization measures designed to aid the domestic economy
at the height of the eurozone crisis. The original terms of the Guarantee Scheme remained
unchanged over the years, but amendments were included to reflect the ongoing
consolidation of Spanish credit institutions and to facilitate a phasing-out of the program
beginning in July 2010 (European Commission 2008c). The second iteration of the program
concluded June 30, 2013 (see Appendix B).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Spain implemented a Guarantee Scheme as one of the first of many independent
stabilization measures announced in response to the global financial crisis.
Other interventions, implemented independently throughout an extended period spanning
from late 2008 through 2014, included the creation of a fund for the acquisition of failing
assets and a comprehensive recapitalization scheme for many major Spanish banks and
credit institutions. A majority of the later actions were taken in response to deteriorating
conditions exacerbated by the Eurozone crisis.
2. The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance implemented the Guarantee Scheme
upon the signing of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 on November 21, 2008.
On October 13, 2008, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance proposed the Guarantee
Scheme in its adoption of the Royal Decree-Law 7/2008 of October 13 on “Urgent Economic
and Financial Measures in relation to the Concerted Action Plan in the Euro Zone.” The
Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 for the granting of State guarantees was then adopted on
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November 21, 2008, published on November 24, 2008, and amended and signed into force
in its final form on December 29, 2008.
3. In accordance with State aid rules, European Commission approval was required
for the implementation of the Guarantee Scheme.
The European Commission authorized the passage of Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 on
December 23, 2008. As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee
Scheme in such a way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain
program features.
4. Initially, up to €100 billion could be guaranteed under the program.
This amount could be increased to €200 billion “if the Spanish authorities consider it
necessary given market conditions” (European Commission 2008b). These funds were to be
drawn down from and distributed equally over the Spanish government’s annual budget for
2008 and 2009, according to the General Budget Law. In 2009, the overall budget was
adjusted to €164 billion for 2008 and 2009 pursuant to Royal Decree Law 9/2009.
5. Eligibility for the Guarantee Scheme was restricted to credit institutions,
consolidated groups of credit institutions, and pools of credit institutions
registered in Spain that met certain market share, previous issuance, and
capitalization requirements.
Applicants to the program needed to receive explicit approval from the Directorate General
of the Treasury and Financial Policy.
Subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions were also eligible for participation in the Guarantee
Scheme but were subject to the same regulations as those registered in Spain. The Guarantee
Scheme excluded branches of foreign credit institutions.
Credit institutions had to meet specific market share, issuance, and capitalization
requirements in order to be fully eligible for the Guarantee Scheme. Each credit institution,
or at least one subsidiary of a consolidated group or pool of credit institutions, had to meet
the following criteria:
•

Possess a share equal to at least 1/1000 of the domestic credit market;

•

Have issued, since October 13, 2003 (five years before the entry into force of the Royal
Decree-Law), instruments “similar to the ones covered by the present Guarantee
Scheme” (European Commission 2008b).
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Regardless of type, credit institutions needed to be “sufficiently capitalized in line with the
national legislation.”5
6. New and senior unsecured debt instruments, including promissory notes, bonds,
and other obligations admitted to trade on the official secondary markets in Spain
were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme.
Securitization notes and subordinated debts were not eligible. The original Royal DecreeLaw initially provided for the possibility of covering other financial instruments such as
interbank deposits. However, Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008—which held legal force
and upon which the European Commission based its authorization—excluded interbank
deposits, options, derivatives, and other instruments “for which the amount of risk might be
difficult to assess by the guarantor” (European Commission 2008b). There was a minimum
issuance requirement for all debt issuances of €10 million.
7. Initially, debt ranging in maturity from three months to three years could be issued
under the Guarantee Scheme.
Initially, debt with a maturity of up to five years could be guaranteed by the government only
subject to European Commission approval based on a specific request and report from the
Bank of Spain.
In 2009, Spain requested that the European Commission extend guarantees for debt with
maturities of up to five years. The Commission approved the measure but limited these
issuances to a maximum of one-third of the overall budget.
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible.
Though not explicitly stated in the implementation documents, the original Ministerial Order
stipulated that if the debt were to be denominated in foreign currency, “the order of granting
the guarantee will establish mechanisms to minimize the foreign currency risk the State
might take” (European Commission 2008b).
9. The Ministry of Economy and Finance imposed individual caps on participation
based on the proportion of the participant’s domestic market share.6
This provision applied to participating credit institutions, consolidated groups, or pools. In
accordance with Article 118 of Law 47/2003 of November 2003, the Ministry reserved the
right to “limit the amount [of guaranteed debt] to reduce the risk involved with granting the
guarantee,” particularly with regard to the capitalization requirements used to determine an
institution’s eligibility (European Commission 2008b).

According to Law 36/2007, dated November 16, 2007, modifying Law 13/1985, dated May 25 ,1985, and
Royal Decree 216/2008, dated February 15, 2008.
6 As defined in epigraph 2.4 of the Statistic Bulletin from the Bank of Spain, September 2008.
5
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10. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the
soundness of the issuing institution and the maturity of the debt guaranteed.
The guarantee fee was determined according to the guidelines presented in the European
Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20,
2008 (European Central Bank 2008). Fees were to be paid to the Spanish government by
participating institutions upon each issuance of guaranteed debt. Debt issuances with a
maturity of a year or less incurred a fixed annual guarantee premium of 50 basis points (bps)
calculated on the nominal value. Those issuances with maturities of more than a year
incurred a fixed annual fee of 50 bps “plus the variable fee corresponding to the relevant
credit default swap,” to be calculated as follows:
a) For credit institutions with representative CDS, the fee was the lower of either:
i) The median value of the five-year CDS spread for the credit institution during the
period between January 1, 2007, and August 31, 2008; or
ii) The median value of the five-year CDS spread during the same period, “depending
on the relevant rating category of the bank concerned based on a representative
sample of large banks in the eurozone” (European Commission 2008b). For a
rating of double-A, the median was set at 36.5 bps; for a rating of single-A, the
median was set at 44.8 bps.
b) For credit institutions with a credit rating but no representative CDS spread, the debt
issuance incurred a fee based on the median value of the five-year CDS spread for
institutions with similar credit ratings during the period between January 1, 2007,
and August 31, 2008, depending on the relevant rating category. For a rating of
double-A, the median was set at 36.5 bps; for a rating of single-A, the median was set
at 44.8 bps.
c) For credit institutions with neither representative CDS nor a credit rating, the debt
issuance incurred a fee based on the median value of the five-year CDS spread for the
lowest rating category during the period between January 1, 2007, and August 31,
2008. The median for the lowest rating category of single-A was set to 44.8 bps, plus
an annual add-on fee of 10 bps.
In 2010, these fees were increased pursuant to new guidance from the European
Commission as follows:
a) 20 bps for institutions with a rating of A-plus or single-A,
b) 30 bps for institutions with a rating of A-minus,
c) 40 bps for institutions with a rating of lower than A-minus .
This increase in fees aimed to incentivize beneficiaries to scale down their guarantees or exit
the program.
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11. There does not appear to have been any restrictions on executive compensation or
dividend payments.
Program documents do not contain any such restrictions.
12. The Spanish government permited a waiver of the beneficium excussionis
historically associated with State guarantee programs.
Embodied in Article 1.830 of the Spanish Civil Code, the beneficium excussionis “refers to the
right or benefit of the guarantor not to be compelled to pay as long as the principal has
enough property” (European Commission 2008b). Had such a provision remained in effect,
investors holding guaranteed debt may have been required to pursue a claim against a
defaulting issuer prior to realizing the guarantee. The waiver of beneficium excussionis thus
provided holders of guaranteed debt with confidence that they would be able to trigger the
guarantee more quickly in the event of default.
13. The Guarantee Scheme issuance window was extended five times and expired on
December 31, 2011, before it was reintroduced, with slightly different terms, in
February 2012.
Although the original Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 specified an end date of June 30,
2009, the program was extended five times, each for a period of six months, to expire on
December 31, 2011 (see Appendix A). This was due to the perceived weakness of the Spanish
savings bank sector and the previous heavy investment in the failing housing market.
The Guarantee Scheme was reintroduced for a six-month period with slightly different terms
in February 2012. This second iteration of the program was extended in June 2012 to
February 2013 and ultimately concluded on June 30, 2013 (see Appendix B).

III. Evaluation
The implementation of the Guarantee Scheme was portrayed as an important initial step in
restoring confidence in Spanish credit institutions and laying a foundation for other
recapitalization and restructuring measures (European Commission 2008a).
Similarly, María González Fernández, Cecilia González Rodríguez, and Carmen Motellón
García, the authors of a report in the CNMV Bulletin, assert that the Guarantee Scheme
“allowed the financial institutions that availed themselves of this facility to face their
financial commitments in 2009 more comfortably” (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de
Valores 2010). They further conclude that “grant of the State guarantees succeeded in
lowering the overall systemic risk, and the successive secured issues allowed the issuers to
face 2009 more comfortably” (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 2010).
In contrast, José Caamaño Alegre and Mukhbira Komilova characterized the Guarantee
Scheme as expensive and linked its high fees to the sovereign rather than to individual banks’

902

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

participation fees (Caamaño Alegre and Komilova 2013). Specifically, guidance from the
European Central Bank called for a uniform fee structure across European countries with
very different sovereign credit ratings meant that Spanish institutions had to pay the same
guarantee fees as similarly rated institutions in other countries despite the guarantee they
received being worth less. This may explain why larger banks, such as BBVA, used their
foreign subsidiaries to issue debt guaranteed under US programs.
A Bank for International Settlements assessment (BIS 2009) found that the bonds issued
under the Guarantee Scheme may have crowded out covered bonds on the national market,
as the debt instruments eligible for guarantee were cheaper for banks to issue (180-200 bps
in total cost versus a 260 bps spread for covered bonds) and were thus preferred by issuers.

IV.
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crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EC_State_Aid_Overview_Dec
isions_Financial_Institutions_2016.pdf.
Key Academic Papers
El Otorgamiento de Avales del Estado a las Emisiones de Deuda de las Entidades Financieras:
Una Aproximación al Caso Español (Caamaño Alegre and Komilova 2013) – Academic paper
retrospectively analyzing the design and usage of the credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/1224Texto%20del%20art%C3%ADculo-5199-1-10-20131210.pdf.
The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent Financial
Crisis (Levy and Schich 2010) – Report comparing the various credit guarantee schemes
implemented by governments around the world in response to the GFC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_and_Schich_2010_0.pd
f.
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The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds (Levy and Zaghini 2010) – Academic
paper describing the evolution and pattern of bond issuance across countries to assess the
effects
of
credit
guarantee
schemes.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_Zaghini_Pricing_Govt_
Guaranteed_Bank_Bonds_2010.pdf.
El Diluvio: The Spanish Banking Crisis, 2008–2012 (Tano 2017) - Academic paper detailing
the Spanish financial crisis from 2008–2012, with particular emphasis on Spanish authorities’
responses.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Santos_The_Spanish_Bankin
g_Crisis_2017.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes (Bank for International Settlements
2009) – Report comparing the usage and effects of various international financial
interventions.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BIS%20%20Assessment%20of%20Financial%20Sector%20Rescue%20Programs%20%20CDS%20premia.pdf.
Financial Stability Report (Bank of Spain 2008) – Report assessing the soundness of Spain’s
financial
system
at
the
height
of
the
GFC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_Spain_Financial_Sta
bility_Report_2008.pdf.
Report on the Financial and Banking Crisis in Spain, 2008–2014 (Bank of Spain 2017) –
Report assessing the slate of financial interventions implemented by the Spanish government
in
response
to
the
GFC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/InformeCrisis_Completo_we
b_en.pdf.
CNMV Bulletin, Quarter 1, 2010 (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 2010) – Report
analyzing
the
outcomes
of
the
Spanish
credit
guarantee
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CNMV.pdf.
The Spanish Economic Crisis: Key Factors and Growth Challenges in the Euro Area (Ortega
and Peñalosa 2012) – Report by the Banco de España assessing the aftermath of the Spanish
economic
crisis
within
the
context
of
the
eurozone.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Ortega_Spanish_Economic_C
risis_2012.pdf.
Spain: Financial Stability Assessment (International Monetary Fund 2012) – IMF country
report assessing the soundness of the Spanish economy following the GFC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr12137.pdf.
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Appendix A: European Commission Prolongations of the Scheme
Spain Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions
Status

State Aid Case

Initial Scheme
1st Prolongation

NN
54/B/2008
277/2008)
N336/2009

2nd Prolongation

EC Decision

End of Extension

(ex-CP Dec. 23, 2008

June 30, 2009

June 25, 2009

Dec. 31, 2009

N588/2009

Dec. 01, 2009

June 30, 2010

3rd Prolongation

N263/2010

June 28, 2010

Dec. 31, 2010

4th Prolongation

SA. 31921 - N530/2010

Nov. 29, 2010

June 30, 2011

5th Prolongation

SA.32990 (2011/N)

June 01, 2011

Dec. 31, 2011

Reintroduction

SA.34224 (2012/N)

Feb. 09, 2012

June 30, 2012

Source: European Commission.
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Appendix B: The 2012 Reintroduction of the Guarantee Scheme
The Guarantee Scheme for Credit Institutions was reintroduced by the Spanish government
in February 2012 as part of a new series of interventions intended to provide additional
support to the domestic banking sector. The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance
committed an additional €100 billion for the issuance of guaranteed debt by participating
credit institutions.
The main terms and conditions governing participation remained the same as those
stipulated in the original Ministerial Order EHA/3364/2008 of December 29, 2008. Under
the terms of the reintroduced scheme, debt eligibility was restricted to maturities of between
one year and five years. In addition, guarantee fees were calculated differently.
First, the total fee consisted of the following:
1. For banks with credit default spread (CDS) data: A base fee of 40 basis points (bps) plus
a risk-based fee equal to the product of 40 bps and a risk metric composed of:
a. “50% of the ratio of the beneficiary’s five-year senior CDS spread over the three
years ending one month before the date of issue of the guaranteed bond to the medial
level of the iTraxx Europe Senior Financials five-year index over the same three-year
period PLUS
b. “One-half of the ratio of the median five-year senior CDS spread of all Member States
to the median five-year senior CDS spread of the Member State granting the
guarantee over the same three-year period” (European Commission 2008c ).
2. For banks without CDS data or without representative CDS data, but with a credit rating,
an equivalent CDS spread would be “derived from the median value of five-year CDS
spreads during the same sample period for the rating category of the bank concerned,
based on a representative sample of large banks in the Member States” (European
Commission 2008c). This determination was to be made by the European Banking
Authority.
3. The guidelines listed under point (2) also applied to banks with neither CDS data nor a
credit rating.
Second, the government charged an upfront fee of 0.5% of the total fee calculated in
accordance with the guidelines. This fee, which was to be paid upon admission to the
program rather than upon the first event of default, was introduced to increase efficiency
and lessen demand for the Guarantee Scheme (European Commission 2008c).
The 2012 reintroduction of the Guarantee Scheme was originally set for a duration of six
months, but was extended twice to conclude on June 30, 2013. Over the course of the
program’s operation, 12 Spanish credit institutions issued a total of €41.2 billion of
guaranteed debt. All debts outstanding under the program were fully amortized by March
14, 2017.
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